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Abstract
Most developed countries hold significant quantities of medical supplies in reserve for
emergency response. Due to high handling costs and remote storage locations, such
stocks are typically not used for day-to-day operations. In consequence, the expiry of
reserve supplies (without use) is a significant problem. One possible remedy for such
wastage is to donate large batches of dated supplies to developing nations, which often
do without adequate medical supplies in their health systems. Here, we focus on personal protective equipment (PPE) and similar products, which have low risks associated
with aging and safety. However, the international community is cautious about donating
dated medical supplies, with the World Health Organization explicitly recommending
against it. Issues of safety, while important, are not the primary concern as recent studies have shown expiration dates to be conservative. Instead, most concerns relate to
macrolevel effects on the recipient country. Taking safety as given, we carefully model
the incentives in the medical supplies donation supply chain, providing insights into
the likely effects of corruption and impacts on the local industry. Overall, we find that
the impact of donation is not monotone in the quality of donated products. In particular, dated donations whose quality is slightly lower than the quality of products in the
local market are likely to be more beneficial than fresh donations; thus, we suggest
that the international community reconsiders its stand on banning donations from dated
reserves. We provide concrete guidelines for such donations and suggest a possible path
for implementation of a donation program.
KEYWORDS
corruption, dated medical supplies, donation

1

INTRODUCTION

A large portion of the world’s population suffers from scarce
healthcare resources, which can lead to unsafe practices
including reusing normally disposable items such as surgical gloves and masks, and using diluted hand-wash, and
so forth (Ider et al., 2012; Okwen et al., 2011). It is estimated that up to 70% of injections in developing countries
are administered with reused and unsterilized syringes and
needles (Khamassi, 2012). This situation is in sharp contrast to the advanced health systems in developed countries.
Accepted by Christopher S Tang, after three revisions.

The U.S. healthcare system wastes a large quantity of medical supplies that are in usable condition; for example, Wan
et al. (2015) estimated that just 4% of all hospitals nationwide waste at least $15.4 million of supplies annually. The
large gap between deprived areas and developed countries
suggests the possibility of donations. In this paper, motivated
by the huge waste of medical products in developed countries, we focus on donations of PPE-type (personal protective
equipment) products.
A key source for such donations could be the medical
reserve stocks in developed countries. Medical reserve refers
to the back-up medical supplies held by a government to
prepare for emergencies. Encouraged by the World Health
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Organization (WHO), most developed countries hold such
reserves, which typically consist of antiviral drugs, vaccines,
syringes, disposable gloves, masks, and gowns. Because
these products usually have a fixed use-by date and the likelihood of using them for emergencies during that shelf-life is
relatively small, these reserves face severe issues with expiration (see below). Further, because some of these reserves have
proved inadequate in the face of COVID-19, we would expect
to see many countries rebuild their stocks after the pandemic
has passed, and likely to even greater levels than seen previously (Dyer, 2020). This will further exacerbate issues of
expiry in a few years’ time.
Our focus in this paper is PPE (such as protective clothing, gloves, masks, and respirators) and similar products (like
hand sanitizers and syringes). These products share similar features: They are protective, disposable, typically not
for repeat use, and are usually labeled with a long fixed
shelf life. They have fewer risks associated with aging as
the WHO suggests PPE beyond the labeled expiration date
“can still be effective at protecting health care providers”
subject to the product being inspected before use (WHO,
2020), whereas drugs and vaccines may become unstable and
dangerous with age. Further, there are no hazardous waste
disposal issues for unused PPE, so there is no concern that the
products are being donated to avoid disposal costs, as there
can be with other types of medical supplies (e.g., Pinheiro,
2008).
PPE and similar products need to be replaced after a
number of years of sitting in a reserve because eventually
their seals are considered nonsterile. An inspection of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS’) reserve stock
reported 84% of examined hand sanitizer was expired with
some by up to 4 years, and 200,000 respirators were beyond
the 5-year manufacturer’s guaranteed usability (US DHS,
2014). In preparation for the COVID-19 pandemic, Ontario,
Canada, found roughly 55 million N95 masks and other medical equipment had passed their expiration date (Martell &
Warburton, 2020). However, old sanitizer is likely more effective than diluted sanitizer and an old respirator will be more
effective than no respirator. These reserve products, if used
for a population that lacks adequate medical resources, could
greatly improve healthcare outcomes.
Nevertheless, despite the huge potential social benefits,
the option of donating aged reserve is not adopted in practice and dated reserve products are typically sent to landfill.
The international community has been cautious, yet with
inconsistent guidelines and regulations. In a prudential guideline, the WHO discourages donating expiring products, and
requires that all donations “should have a remaining shelf-life
of at least one year” when arriving in the recipient country (WHO, 2011). Meanwhile, although acknowledging the
WHO’s guideline, the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) states that it is willing to donate expired medicine
supplies on “a case-by-case basis” (FDA, 2011).
These seemingly contradictory stances do not deny
the potential benefits of donation, especially when the
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recipient areas are extremely short of medical products.
Caution regarding donating dated medical supplies can be
attributed to four aspects: namely, efficacy—whether it is safe
to use products close or past the labeled shelf life (e.g., Saha
& Galper, 2013); ethics/fairness—whether such donations
sufficiently consider the “rights and worth of different populations” (Pinheiro, 2008); corruption—corrupt bureaus may
take advantage of donation to line their own pockets (e.g.,
Shelley, 2014); and adverse effects on the local industry—
donations can fail to help the recipient areas by pushing local
suppliers out (e.g., Moyo, 2009).
Efficacy arguments against using dated products are based
on the assumption that expiring or expired products, as
defined by the “expiry date” label, lose their potency and
could be harmful. However, a product does not become
unsafe immediately after the labeled expiry date. The labeled
date is usually much shorter than the true shelf life, which
is typically unknown and is estimated quite conservatively
(Pomerantz, 2004). Convincing evidence has been produced by the Shelf Life Extension Program (SLEP), which
found 88% of the tested product lots could be extended
at least 1 year beyond their original expiration date for an
average extension of 66 months (Lyon et al., 2006). To
address the efficacy concern, we assume that the donated
products will be used within a short enough time span
(relative to the long lifetime of the products) that further
in-country degradation is a second-order effect (and not
modeled).
We do not consider the ethical issue of whether it is
“fair” for a population to use dated medical supplies, that is,
whether it treats people with sufficient dignity (e.g., Tomasini
& Van Wassenhove, 2009). Comprehensively studying the
fairness aspects would require discussions from a sociological perspective, which is beyond the scope of this study.
Instead, we take a more pragmatic approach that currently
we have large quantities of usable supplies being dumped
in developed countries and large populations doing without suitable supplies in developing nations. We therefore ask
whether the recipient nation would be materially better off
with these supplies.
From the recipient’s perspective, this paper investigates
whether dated donation is beneficial when there is the potential for corruption and impacts on the local industry. In
particular, we formulate a Stackelberg game between an official who is in charge of the donated supply and a local
monopoly supplier who responds to the official’s actions (i.e.,
whether the donation is provided free) and sets the market
price. If the market price is forced too low, the supplier cannot cover the overhead cost and will exit the market. The
official can be noncorrupt or corrupt, which could lead to
different objectives: A noncorrupt official looks to maximize the region’s healthcare welfare, which is modeled as a
Cobb–Douglas function, whereas a corrupt official aims to
maximize his own interests by pocketing the money from
selling the donation. To focus on the impact of corruption
resulting from the donation, we look at donation-related
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corruption, which emerges only when donation stocks are
made available. We analyze and compare the region’s healthcare welfare and the supplier’s decision in three cases: the
base case when there is no donation, a noncorrupt official
with donation, and a corrupt official with donation.
We find that the value of the donations is not monotonic in
their quality, and so dated donations could be more beneficial
for the recipient country than fresh donations. Specifically,
while very dated donations are certainly not beneficial, fresh
donations could make the whole recipient country reliant on
donation by driving out the local industry; and further, when
coupled with corrupt officials, fresh donations could make
the recipient country worse off compared to the case without donation. This is because donation products serve as an
alternative to the local products and compete with the supplier. Whether the official is corrupt or not, donation forces
the local supplier to lower the market price, and a high quality of donation could drive the supplier’s price too low to
maintain its operations and cause the supplier to exit the market, which could discourage any further attempts to develop
local supply capacity. Our analysis suggests that dated donations of an appropriate quality could alleviate these problems
and so provide a viable solution, reducing the adverse impact
on the local industry and constraining the negative impact
from corruption.
Overall, we recommend reconsidering the bans on donating dated medical products: Such bans may be relaxed if there
are no additional safety and ethical issues, for example, when
the products (such as PPE) pose low risks of harm and when
such donations are well stored (e.g., in the reserve) and are
not being donated to avoid disposal costs. There need to be
strict requirements on the donation product: The product efficacy needs to be proven; and it is also important that the
product quality is lower than that of the fresh product from
local suppliers, otherwise the effect on the local market will
be too detrimental. This could be achieved through rigorous
testing and clear labeling of the product. Although our work
shows that donation of slightly dated products can be beneficial, this must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure that
other factors not explicitly modeled in the work, such as medical safety, ethical issues, and environmental concerns, are
not compromised. For example, donation of dated products
with adequate efficacy should be agreed upon by the recipient before these products are made available; otherwise, it
could lead to a higher distrust between the recipient and the
donor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents our base
model of the healthcare supply chain for the product being
considered, and Section 4 models two cases where dated
donation is provided with a noncorrupt manager and a
corrupt manager, respectively. Then, Section 5 compares
the three modeled cases and discusses the results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper and makes concrete recommendations for implementation of donation programs of
dated reserve products.
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3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Our work relates to three broad streams of literature:
donation-related operations, the impact of donation, and corruption. In this section, we review the relevant work and
discuss our contributions to the literature.
First, our work contributes to the growing literature on
donation-related operations, particularly for medical supplies
donation from the recipient’s perspective. One growing topic
in donation of medical supplies is medical surplus recovery
and allocation; see Zhang et al. (2020) for an overview. With
known recipient valuations, Atasu et al. (2017) suggest that a
provider-driven model can improve value provision to recipients, where the donor selects recipients and decides the type
and quantity of donations. Zhang et al. (2020) consider private recipient valuations and design a mechanism to enable
the donor to select the recipients to serve at each shipping
opportunity. Essentially, research on medical surplus recovery studies a resource allocation problem without monetary
transfer, where the main focus is matching uncertain supply of medical donations with recipients from a waiting list.
In these studies, the matching problem is studied from the
donor’s perspective, yet the outcomes for donation recipients
are not discussed. We take a different perspective and investigate the impact of providing medical supplies donations on
the recipient, in line with the call for donations to take the
recipient’s actual needs into account (e.g., Berenguer & Shen,
2020).
A few studies of donation operations explicitly consider
the decision or the outcome on the donation recipient’s
side. Natarajan and Swaminathan (2014) study the recipient’s optimal procurement policy with funding constraints,
where the timing of the receipt of previously promised funding from donor agencies is uncertain and constrained. Taylor
and Xiao (2014) consider the subsidizing strategy in the
distribution channel and investigate the impact of donor subsidy on recipients’ access to malaria drugs, and find that the
donor should subsidize purchases but not sales. Further, Taylor and Xiao (2019) look at consumer awareness changes
in a donation program implemented through a commercial
channel, and examine how the donor’s optimal subsidy and
utility should change with the loss of price control and the
level of consumer awareness. While these studies provide
important insights informing donor decisions to better help
less developed areas, donation quality is not considered and
bureaucratic corruption is not discussed. Different from these
studies, our work investigates the impact of donation quality
from the recipient’s perspective, and looks at how donation can affect recipient welfare and the local supplier when
confronted with noncorrupt versus corrupt officials.
Our work also contributes to the broader literature on the
impact of donation on the recipients. While studies on this
topic are relatively limited in the operations management
literature, there are extensive discussions in development economics and public health. This body of literature has found
that, despite the potential benefits, in-kind donations can pose
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a negative price effect, that is, large volumes of donations
may shift the supply curve and put pressure on local producers to reduce prices (cf. Awokuse, 2011). Originating from
food aid (Schultz, 1960), the price effect has been studied
in several empirical investigations of donations of food (e.g.,
Tadesse & Shively, 2009), used clothing (Frazer, 2008), and
shoes (Wydick et al., 2014), but not yet medical donations.
While a negative price effect has been found in apparel and
shoe donations, mixed findings have been reported for food
donations, with the price effect supported in some but not
other studies. The varying conclusions from these studies
suggest the impact on the local market and the recipient’s
economy depends on the context and the type of aid. Tadesse
and Shively (2009) find that the quantity of food donation
influences the extent of the price effect. Specifically, the
effect on local prices and local food production is detrimental when the donation shipments exceed the 10% threshold
of local production; below this level the impacts appeared to
be benign.
Compared to the work on the price effect, discussions
about the impact of in-kind medical donations (new or
dated) are more qualitative and narrative. Igoumenidis et al.
(2013) discuss the impact of in-kind drug donations (as
opposed to cash) on the recipient and suggest a localized and
decentralized approach to manage the aid, so donations can
bypass unnecessary procedures and encounter less corruption. Despite the concerns raised regarding dated donations,
other voices support the donation of subpar medical supplies.
From a medical ethics perspective, Saha and Galper (2013)
suggest donations of products that are known to be stable past
their expiry date can be made per recipient’s request. Overall, though these studies touch the impact of donation quality,
they use a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach, and
the negative price effect has not been well studied for medical
donations. As such, our work contributes by quantifying the
price effect for one type of medical donation while looking
into the impact of donation quality.
Finally, this work sits within the literature on corruption
as we explicitly consider that corrupt members of the supply
chain may divert the donated products for their own gains.
Underdeveloped countries are particularly vulnerable to corruption and fraud in their healthcare sectors. Partly because
the administrative systems are neither well developed nor
transparent, leakages of public resources and misuse of medical supplies for private gain are common in these countries
(Musau & Vian, 2008). There is evidence that donation provides a chance for corrupt bureaucrats in recipient countries
to divert the products for repackaging and resale. For example, the Uganda Minister of Health estimated that half of the
medicines accessed by the government for public healthcare
were siphoned off (MeTA, 2009). Media reports also claim
that medical supplies donated to North Korea are diverted by
corrupt officials and sold at local markets (Kim et al., 2013)
and that officials in Africa divert and sell donated medicines
for their personal profit (Shelley, 2014).
Modeling the role of an official in the donation supply chain, we contribute to corruption studies related to

government officials and public products. Due to the difficulties of incorporating all the cost, demand, and supply
functions, it is challenging to build a model of bureaucratic
corruption (Jain, 2001). Looking at government officials selling government property for personal gain, Sheiffer and
Vishny (1993) find that weak governments usually experience high levels of corruption, which is very distortionary
and costly. Though bureaucratic corruption is commonly perceived as bad practice, some suggest that corruption may
improve efficiency and help growth, given the preexisting
distortions in underdeveloped countries (cf. Bardhan, 1997;
Mèon & Weill, 2010). Corruption is typically modeled as a
principal–agent model in which the government or the citizens act as the principals and aim to reduce the corrupt
behaviors of officials (e.g., Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000). Different from the principal–agent setting, Popa (2014) takes
the view that corruption can benefit both the corrupt officials and individual citizens, and models corrupt interactions
as markets in which public goods are sold. Our results suggest that, depending on the donation quality, corruption can
hurt or benefit a recipient’s healthcare welfare as well as the
local supplier’s profitability, and we characterize these conditions. As such, we extend the modeling of corruption to
the donation supply chain setting, analyze the impact on the
recipient, and obtain managerial insights from the structural
results.

3

MODEL DESCRIPTION

We consider an overall impoverished area/country where
there is a shortage of medical products. Donations could help
the area improve healthcare, but could also influence the local
market and induce corrupt behaviors by officials processing
the donated products. In this work, we model the impacts
associated with donations of one type of medical product
(e.g., PPE), which has a long shelf life and whose properties
are deemed to be stable.
The product can continue to be useful after the initial
labeled dates, especially if it is well stored. For example, after
being in storage for a long time, the strap and nose foam of
a respirator may become less elastic, which can reduce the
fit and seal and make the respirator less effective in keeping
outside air from leaking around the edges of the respirator;
but this just means the respirator is less likely to perform at
its full potential (3M, 2016), not that it is totally ineffective.
While such dated products are inappropriate to use in a setting
where respirators are mandated, such respirators will improve
health welfare in settings where they are not typically used.
Indeed, PPE products past expiration dates are distributed and
used for prolonged hours in developed countries under situations of desperate shortage (e.g., BBC News, 2020; Martha,
2020), and recently the CDC (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention) issued guidance explicitly endorsing the use
of certain respirators from the reserve past their labeled shelf
life when responding to the COVID-19 pandemic (CDC,
2020).
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Motivated by the above, we assume that the quality/effectiveness degrades as the product ages but at a very
slow rate (Saha & Galper, 2013); thus, the quality of donated
products is no higher than that of fresh products but does
not change during the decision horizon. Another example of
donated product fitting our assumptions is where new models
are more effective than older models. If the donation quality is higher than the equivalent available the local market,
then donation will surely outperform the local supplies and
the potential supplier effects discussed in this paper will be
even more than if quality is equal, though this is not explicitly
modeled. The quality of the product indicates its healthcare
value, and a higher quality will lead to higher healthcare
welfare (if everything else is held equal), as detailed in
Equation (1) below.
Several regions are contained in the impoverished area,
and they can get the product from two different sources. One
source is to buy from the supplier in the local market. Yet,
the amount to purchase is subject to a budget constraint, so
it is possible these regions cannot afford enough product to
fulfill their healthcare needs. An alternative source is from
donation, which is expected to ease the need for the product
and improve healthcare; this humanitarian purpose motivates
donations to these regions.
However, donations could be taken advantage of by corrupt
officials, possibly undermining the expected positive effects.
Meanwhile, the local supplier could react to donations and
change the affordability of the product. As corrupt officials
and the strategic supplier change the dynamics associated
with donation, it is necessary to investigate if donation can
fulfill the humanitarian purpose as expected. Though belonging to the same area/country, each regional administration
oversees its regional healthcare issues and is able to secure
donations from independent sources; as a result, the type and
the amount of donations received by each region are relatively independent (Shaw et al., 2015). Thus, we can look
at a typical region as a donation recipient and analyze the
impacts of donation. While the region could receive donations intermittently, we consider the time span for a large
donation to be used in the region (if freely available); the
length of the time span will depend on the donation size but
is generally sufficient for the local supplier to react and adjust
prices accordingly.

3.1

The model and notation

Over the considered time span, the region has a healthcare
budget T, which can be used to procure the product considered in this work as well as other healthcare products. With
budget T, and subject to the market price p set by the supplier, the region decides how much product to buy from the
market, in order to maximize the healthcare welfare of the
population served by the region. Due to the budget constraint
and/or high market price, the region may not be able to afford
all necessary healthcare products.
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Denote the region’s purchasing amount as xs , and let
v denote the quality of the fresh product, that is, the
healthcare value provided per unit product. Purchasing xs
units of product may or may not use all of the budget
T. Thus, the healthcare welfare comes from two sources:
the health-related utility from disposable money after (or
not) purchasing the product and the healthcare improvement associated with accessing the product. Here, we use the
term “healthcare welfare” to highlight the healthcare-related
considerations. If we ignore donations, then the healthcare
welfare, W(T; xs ), is represented in the Cobb–Douglas form
as in Equation (1), with 0 < 𝛼 < 1,
W(T; xs ) = (T − pxs )𝛼 (vxs )1−𝛼 .

(1)

The parameter 𝛼 reflects the preference of saving the budget for other healthcare products and services, relative to
spending it on the product under consideration. A large 𝛼
indicates the product has a relatively low priority in the
healthcare system; and this is likely to be the case for the
types of product considered in this paper, for example, PPE,
as underdeveloped countries experience inadequate use of
these products due to limited medical resources, as discussed
in the introduction.
While the region decides the purchase quantity xs , the supplier will react by adjusting the selling price p. Modeling a
monopoly supplier means we do not need to consider competition in the market, and thus provides a special case to clearly
quantify the effect that donations can pose on the local industry; other market types would also experience similar effects
to those studied in this paper. Due to the investment in infrastructure and the financial requirements to cover the overhead
cost, the supplier is subject to a minimum viable price p̃ > 0
in order to remain operational, that is, the supplier cannot
sustain in the market if the selling price p is lower than p̃.
Since the region’s budget comes from various sources such
as the local government’s fiscal revenue and cash donations,
the local supplier does not know the exact budget level T, but
has a reasonable understanding of the market and thus knows
budget T can be drawn from the cumulative distribution function Φ(⋅), for which T m represents the upper bound of the
budget so Φ(T m ) = 1. Based on her estimation of the market,
the supplier accordingly sets price p in order to maximize her
expected revenue R(p). Increased prices will mean that the
region can afford fewer units of the product, which is somewhat discretionary in the recipient area (Okwen et al., 2011).
On top of budget T, the region may receive an external
donation of products, though the donated products could be
dated, that is, if they come from the medical reserve. Let q
denote the quality of dated donation, then 0 ≤ q ≤ v, as discussed in the third paragraph of Section 3. How the donation
is processed, that is, how much of the donation indeed reaches
the region, denoted by xd , impacts the healthcare welfare.
We will refer to the decision maker processing the donation
as “the manager.” Such a person could be sitting anywhere
(at a high level or a fairly low level) along the supply chain
(within or outside the region) before the donation reaches the
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region. When processing the donation, a “corrupt” manager
seeks to maximize his own interests by selling donation products in the black market, the objective function of which will
be made concrete later; while a “non-corrupt” manager seeks
to maximize the healthcare welfare so the objective function
coincides with the region’s welfare function W(⋅). Focusing
on the effect of donation-related corruption, we do not consider corruption in operations other than those associated with
donations, because such corrupt conduct would exist even
when donation is not available.
As the donation provides extra resources for the region and
thus changes the dynamics of the local market, the supplier
will react by adjusting market price p, which will be discussed
later in corresponding scenarios. In this aspect we assume
complete information, such that the supplier can anticipate
the response functions of the region and the manager; this
standard modeling practice allows us to derive the supplier’s
decision and obtain meaningful insights.
Within the considered time frame, the region’s total potential demand for the product is D, so xs + xd ≤ D holds. A
fixed demand is assumed for simplicity and to single out the
effects of corruption and donation. In a slight abuse of notation, we use xs and xd to denote the actual quantities, and
xs (T, p) and xd (T, p) to denote the region’s response function
where the quantity is a function of budget T and price p. A
summary of the notation is as follows.

v

the quality of fresh supplies from the local market,

q

the quality of donated supplies, with 0 ≤ q ≤ v,

T

the amount of total budget available for the region,

Φ(⋅)

the cumulative distribution function of budget level T,

Tm

the upper bound of possible budget level, with Φ(T m ) = 1,

D

the total potential demand for the product,

p

the market price charged by the supplier,

p̃

the supplier’s minimum viable price,

xs

the quantity purchased from the supplier for the region,

xd

the quantity of donated products that reach the region,

𝛼

the coefficient in the healthcare welfare function W(T, xs ).

The solution is straightforward: Whether and how much to
buy depends on the region’s budget level T, and the price p
depends on the budget distribution, as per Proposition 1. A
superscript b is used to indicate the results for the base case,
and a superscript ∗ indicates the optimal solution.
Proposition 1.
1−𝛼

T m.
1. The market price pb∗ =
D
2. The quantity of product purchased with budget T is
T
xsb∗ (T) = m D.
T

3. The healthcare welfare with budget T is W b (T) =
D
𝛼 𝛼 v1−𝛼 ( m )1−𝛼 T.
T

It is not surprising that the amount of product purchased,
xsb∗ , depends on the budget level. With the Cobb–Douglas
welfare function, the region spends a fixed proportion, 1 − 𝛼,
of its budget until it reaches all D products. The amount of
product the region purchases is proportional to D and the
proportion is T∕T m . That means if the realization of the budget resolves around the very low end of the distribution,
then a region would only access very few products; and a
region can only enjoy all D products if its budget is at the
upper bound T m . This comes with the implicit assumption
that the quantity ordered could be any fraction of the demand;
allowing only integers for the order quantity is not likely to
generate additional results but will make the analysis more
complex.
Setting price pb∗ , the supplier can exploit the market: She
sets the price high enough so that only regions with the maximum budget T m can afford to fulfill demand D, and thus
extracts all the surplus from the market. This is intuitive
because the supplier acts like a monopolist. While a monopolist hurts market efficiency in general, the harm is more
evident in the studied context, an underdeveloped area in need
of the scarce resource. Recall that the supplier has a minimum viable price p̃. To study the impact of donation on the
supplier, we assume p̃ < pb∗ ; otherwise the supplier will not
operate in the market even when there is no donation.

4
3.2

MODEL ANALYSIS

The base case

We first consider the base case when donation is not available, and take this as a benchmark. When there is no donation,
the manager cannot conduct donation-related corruption, and
the region only needs to make one decision about xs , that is,
how much to buy from the supplier. The game has two stages:
First, anticipating the region’s response function xs (T, p), the
supplier sets price p; and second, the region decides xs given
the market price p. To solve this, xs (T, p) can be derived
by maximizing the healthcare function W(T; xs ) in Equation (1); then with xs (T, p) and the budget distribution Φ(T),
the supplier sets p to maximize her expected revenue R(p) =
pE[xs (T, p)], where E[⋅] stands for the expectation.

In this section, we consider situations when donation products are provided. If the manager is corrupt (as is discussed in
Section 4.2), donated products may be diverted into the black
market and generate a charge for the region to receive them:
In that case, the unit price of the donated product is denoted
by w. Compared to the base case, the total amount obtained
by the region is xs + xd , and the resultant healthcare welfare
changes to Equation (2) to account for both the fresh and the
donation products.
Before investigating the impact of donation, it is helpful to
understand how the region should make purchasing decisions
from a healthcare welfare perspective. Putting aside whether
the manager is corrupt or not, to maximize the region’s
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healthcare welfare is to solve the following problem:
max W(T; xs , xd ) = (T − pxs − wxd )𝛼 (vxs + qxd )1−𝛼 , (2)
xs ,xd

Therefore, the results give an upper bound for a region’s welfare and a lower bound for the adverse effect on the local
industry.

s.t. 0 ≤ xs + xd ≤ D; xs , xd ≥ 0.
Let xsh (T, w, p) and xdh (T, w, p) be the region’s response
functions of the quantity to buy from the supplier and the
donation, respectively; we will drop some or all of the arguments on xsh (⋅) and xdh (⋅) when doing so causes no confusion.
Define wt = pq∕v, and this is the threshold for w beyond
which xdh (T, w) = 0 for all T, that is, buying the donation
product is uneconomic relative to buying the fresh product.
Then Proposition 2 gives the results.
Proposition 2. The region’s response functions depend on
the market price p, donation price w, and budget T as
follows:
1. For w ≥ wt , xdh (T) = 0 and xsh (T) is as per Proposition 1.
2. For 0 < w < wt ,
(

xsh , xdh

)

⎧ 1−𝛼
⎪(0, w T)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪(0, D)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
=⎨
)
⎪(
⎪ (1 − 𝛼)T − wD − 𝛼(pq − wv)D , D − xh
s
⎪
p−w
(v − q)(p − w)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪(D, 0)
⎩

if 0 ≤ T <
if

w
w
D≤T<
D
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
+

if

w
D;
1−𝛼

𝛼(pq − wv)
D;
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)

𝛼(pq − wv)
w
D+
D≤T
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)
p
𝛼(pq − wv)
<
D+
D;
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)

if T ≥

p
𝛼(pq − wv)
D+
D.
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)

(3)
3. For w = 0,

xsh

+ xdh

= D, and

( h h)
xs , xd
𝛼pq
⎧(0, D)
if 0 ≤ T <
D;
⎪
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)
⎪
)
⎪(
p
𝛼pq
⎪ (1 − 𝛼) T − 𝛼qD , D − xh
D≤T<
D
if
s
⎪
p
v−q
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)
1−𝛼
⎪
=⎨
𝛼pq
⎪
+
D;
⎪
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)
⎪
⎪
⎪
p
𝛼pq
⎪(D, 0)
if T ≥
D+
D.
⎩
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)(v − q)

(4)
With the region’s response functions in Proposition 2,
the supplier and the manager will respond by setting p and
w, respectively, based on their objectives. Next we discuss
two scenarios: when the manager is noncorrupt and when
the manager is corrupt. These results will assume no constraint for the local supplier’s capacity. Intuitively, one would
expect having a supply constraint to both decrease the healthcare welfare and increase the pressure on the local industry.

4.1

Noncorrupt manager

In this section, we consider how donation could impact the
region by putting the possibility of corruption aside. While
the region’s purchasing decision follows Proposition 2, a
noncorrupt manager will decide w so as to maximize the
region’s healthcare welfare W(T; xs , xd ), as in Equation (2).
This objective function implies that any revenue raised from
the donation, that is, wxd , will be taken from the healthcare system and used for the region’s other expenditures,
given the noncorrupt manager does not keep it. Alternatively, the noncorrupt manager could add the revenue back
into the region’s healthcare budget; in this case, the objective function becomes (T − pxs )𝛼 (vxs + qxd )1−𝛼 . We can
show that the noncorrupt manager’s optimal decision is the
same under these two objective functions. A superscript n
is used to indicate the results for the noncorrupt manager
case.
Let wn∗ be the optimal price a noncorrupt manager would
set for the donation, then wn∗ = 0 regardless of the market
price p, as is shown in Proposition 3. This is because charging for the donation will influence the amount of products
accessed by the region. Recall that the healthcare welfare
comes from two sources: the product and the health-related
utility from the disposable money. Charging would reduce
the quantity of products affordable for the region and so
reduce the product-related welfare, while the amount of disposable money remains the same if the revenue is returned
to the healthcare budget, or decreases if not. Therefore, a
noncorrupt manager will not charge for the donation but
instead distribute it for free. This serves the humanitarian purpose of donations and conforms to the common
expectation.
When there are free and sufficient donations, the region
will top up the total quantity of products to its demand D,
since free donated products can always improve the healthcare welfare. Accordingly, the supplier’s revenue function is
different from when no donation is available, which motivates her to adjust the market price p. Specifically, in the case
where the equilibrium price pn∗ is no lower than the minimum viable price p̃, the supplier would like to maximize her
expected revenue function below, where xsn (T, p) equals xsh as
per Proposition 2 Part 3:
max Rn (p; p ≥ p̃) = pE[xsn (T, p)]
(v−q)p+𝛼pq

=

(1−𝛼)(v−q)

∫

𝛼pq
(1−𝛼)(v−q)

D

D

]
𝛼qD
(1 − 𝛼)T
−
dΦ(T)
p
p
v−q
[

∞

+

∫ (v−q)p+𝛼pq D
(1−𝛼)(v−q)

pD dΦ(T).

(5)
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To derive the pricing decision for the supplier, we make
a further assumption so that the model is more tractable.
Assume that the budget level T follows a uniform distribution between 0 and T m , that is, Φ(T) = T∕T m for 0 ≤
T ≤ T m ; then we can show the supplier’s expected revenue
function Rn (p) is concave in price p and so the optimum is
achieved when the first-order condition (FOC) is satisfied.
Proposition 3 gives the pricing decision results and shows the
donation quality q influences the supplier’s price pn∗ . This in
turn influences the composition of the products accessed by
the region and the healthcare welfare achieved, as outlined in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 3. If the manager is noncorrupt, then:
1. the donation price wn∗ = 0,
2. if donation quality q ≤ q̂n , the supplier’s price pn∗ =
(v−q)(1−𝛼)T m
; otherwise, the supplier exits the market,
(v−q+2𝛼q)D

where the threshold q̂n is the highest donation quality q
(v−q)(1−𝛼)T m
≥ p̃.
such that
(v−q+2𝛼q)D

One important observation from Proposition 3 is that the
supplier could be driven out of market by high-quality donation products. This is due to the supplier’s reaction to the
donation: As shown in Proposition 4, the supplier lowers
her price for fresh products as donation quality q increases,
because donation breaks her monopoly power. A donation
quality q > q̂n would drive the supplier’s price below her
minimum viable price p̃ and force the supplier to leave the
market. Even when the supplier can remain in the market (i.e.,
if the donation quality q ≤ q̂n ), the supplier does not benefit
from her adjusted pricing strategy as her price and expected
revenue decreases with donation quality q.
Proposition 4.
1. The threshold q̂n decreases with the supplier’s minimum
1−𝛼 m
T , then 0 < q̂n < v.
viable price p̃. If 0 < p̃ <
D
2. If donation quality q ≤ q̂n , then the supplier can remain in
the market:
(a) The supplier’s price pn∗ decreases with donation
quality q.
(b) For a given budget T, the healthcare welfare function
W n (T) increases with donation quality q.
(c) The welfare function W n (T) is always concave in
𝛼qT m
donation quality q for T ≤
, and, if 2𝛼 − 1 ≥
v−q+2𝛼q

0, it is also concave in donation quality q for T >
𝛼qT m
.
v−q+2𝛼q

3. Regarding the continuity of the welfare function W n (T):
𝛼qT m
(a) For all T ≤
, W n (T) is continuous and
v−q+2𝛼q

increases with donation quality q.
𝛼qT m
, W n (T) is noncontinuous at q =
(b) For all T >
v−q+2𝛼q

q̂n . Specifically, the right limit W n (T, q̂n +) is smaller

ZHOU AND OLSEN

than the left limit W n (T, q̂n −); and W n (T) increases
with donation quality q for q > q̂n .
If the supplier is out of the market, then regions intending
to purchase from the supplier will have to turn to donation.
As indicated by the expression of the product composition
(xsn∗ , xdn∗ ) (which is in the Supporting Information), regions
with a high budget will still be willing to buy from the supplier even when the donation quality q is high and approaches
the fresh product quality v, yet there is no way for them to do
so if the supplier exits the market. Having the supplier out
of market makes the whole recipient country reliant on donation. To make matters worse, the healthcare welfare decreases
when regions intending to buy from the supplier switch to
donation, because taking the donation is a suboptimal action
for them. As shown in Proposition 4, Item 3, if the supplier
𝛼qT m
, the
exits the market, for regions with a budget T >
v−q+2𝛼q

healthcare welfare is lower than it would be if the supplier
stays in the market.
As such, the analysis indicates donation could be a doubleedged sword. While donation seemingly improves access to
the product, it could drive out the local supplier and fail to
improve healthcare welfare as expected. The results confirm
the fear that free donations can hurt the local industry and
make the recipient country too reliant on foreign aid (Moyo,
2009; Oxfam, 2005). Having donations drive out the local
supplier could discourage the development of local production capacity and distribution network, and thus hinder the
long-term development of the local community. This is in line
with the impression that many underdeveloped countries do
not appear to make much headway, even when they receive
massive amounts of donations and assistance. In line with the
views Moyo outlines in her book (Moyo, 2009), we provide a
model-based analysis showing that free donations of a good
quality may well be the reason for that.
Due to the adverse effect on the local supplier, the recipient region’s healthcare welfare is not continuously increasing
with donation quality, and donations of a very high quality
do not necessarily improve welfare more than donations of
a lower quality. This leads to our key observation for this
section.
Observation 1. Donations of an average quality, which is
somewhat lower than the fresh quality but still reasonably
good, could ease the adverse effect on the supplier but also
significantly improve healthcare welfare.
This observation follows from two results in Proposition 4.
(1) The threshold quality for the supplier to remain in the
market, q̂n , is lower than the fresh quality v. As discussed,
donation of a quality lower than the threshold quality q̂n
(and thus lower than the fresh quality v), that is, q < q̂n <
v, could keep the supplier in the market. We note that the
threshold q̂n decreases with the supplier’s minimum viable
price p̃. A high minimum price p̃ leads to a low threshold
q̂n and indicates donation of a low quality could push the

19375956, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.13828 by NHMRC National Cochrane Australia, Wiley Online Library on [24/11/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

8

supplier out of market; this is unlikely because a high minimum viable price, especially when it gets close to the
monopoly price, would make it hard for the supplier to make
sufficient profit even when donation is not available. As such,
a likely and also preferable situation is that the supplier’s
minimum viable price p̃ is of a medium to low level (com1−𝛼 m
T ). In this case, the supplier
pared to the monopoly price
D
can stay in the market with donation products of a reasonably high quality because the threshold quality q̂n is high
(while still lower than the fresh quality). (2) The healthcare
welfare W n (T) is concavely increasing with donation quality q in several cases; particularly when the budget level is
𝛼qT m
, and when the product has a relalow, that is, T <
v−q+2𝛼q

tively low priority in the healthcare system, that is, 𝛼 ≥ 0.5,
as with the typical products considered in this paper. The
concave welfare function W n (T) indicates donations could be
of a slightly lower quality (compared to the fresh products),
without reducing the healthcare welfare too much. Note that
low-budget poor regions are the ones that need donations the
most; the humanitarian purpose of donation can be fulfilled,
as long as the donation quality is high enough to ensure the
welfare of these poor regions increases to a satisfactory level.
While the above is derived when the noncorrupt manager’s
objective coincides with the healthcare welfare function,
some may argue that a noncorrupt manager should care
about overall social welfare, including for the supplier who
contributes to the local economy. The solution of donation
quality being slightly lower than the fresh quality provides
a viable and practical approach for a noncorrupt manager
who cares about both the supplier’s revenue and the healthcare welfare. The ideal level for donation quality could be
determined by jointly considering the supplier’s price and the
impact on the healthcare welfare.

4.2

Corrupt manager

In this section, we consider the case when the manager is
corrupt. The corrupt manager would divert the donation for
sale on the black market (e.g., Kim et al., 2013; Shelley,
2014), and thus would seek to maximize his personal earnings
by setting price w for the donation product. Since Proposition 2 shows the donation cannot be sold if w > wt , the viable
price range for donation is w ≤ wt . Anticipating the corrupt
manager’s decision of donation price w, the supplier would
set market price p accordingly. As previously, we assume
full information, as is relatively standard, and considering
partial information is beyond the scope of this paper. Proposition 5 presents how the supplier’s and the corrupt manager’s
decisions depend on donation quality q, and outlines the
properties of these decisions and the welfare function. A
superscript c is used for the results with a corrupt manager.
Proposition 5. If the manager is corrupt, let q̂c be the highest
donation quality q such that pc (q) ≥ p̃ where pc (q) is the sup-
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plier’s response function, then the supplier exits the market if
q > q̂c .
1. The threshold q̂c decreases with the supplier’s minimum
1−𝛼 m
T , then 0 < q̂c < v.
viable price p̃. If 0 < p̃ <
D
c∗
2. The supplier’s price p decreases with donation quality q
for q ≤ q̂c .
3. The donation price wc∗ increases with donation quality q
v
}, and decreases with donation quality
if q ≤ min{q̂c ,
v

2𝛼+1

q if
< q ≤ q̂c .
2𝛼+1
4. The donation price wc∗ is noncontinuous at q = q̂c and
(1−𝛼)T m
for q > q̂c .
increases to
D
5. For a given budget T, the healthcare welfare function
W c (T) increases with donation quality q for q ≤ q̂c .
6. The welfare function W c (T) is noncontinuous at q = q̂c :
the right limit W c (T, q̂c +) is smaller than the left limit
W c (T, q̂c −); and W c (T) increases with quality q for q >
q̂c .
Proposition 5 shows that the supplier will leave the market
if the donation quality q is high (i.e., q > q̂c ), which is similar
to the noncorrupt manager case. Responding to the supplier’s
exit, the donation price and the welfare function are not continuous anymore, which will be further discussed later. When
the supplier is in the market, that is, q ≤ q̂c , both the corrupt
manager’s and the supplier’s pricing decisions are continuous, but with different monotonicity. Based on Proposition 5,
Items 2 and 3, as donation quality q increases, the supplier’s
price continues to decrease, while the corrupt manager’s price
v
}
for donated products first increases when q ≤ min{q̂c ,
2𝛼+1
and then decreases until quality q reaches q̂c .
v
} is intuitive, as
The case when quality q ≤ min{q̂c ,
2𝛼+1
a better quality leads to a higher price for donation product
and drives down the price for fresh product. As a result, a
low quality will keep the donation price low yet allow the
market price to be high, so that the case q = 0 resembles the
base case where there is no donation available. This suggests
that if donation quality is low, the corrupt manager cannot
make welfare worse than the base case, when considering
donation-related corruption only. Obviously we do not want
donations with a very low quality, because that does not serve
the purpose of providing aid.
v
< q ≤ q̂c , the price for
It appears surprising that when
2𝛼+1
donated products decreases with donation quality, since one
would naturally expect a higher price for better quality. This
happens because of the competition between the supplier and
the corrupt manager, which resembles a “price war.” Donation being available breaks the supplier’s monopoly power
and directly competes with the supplier’s products. Once
donation quality is above a certain threshold, that is, q >
v
, as donation quality gets higher, the difference between
2𝛼+1
donation and fresh products gets smaller and they become
more homogenous, so the competition gets more intense and
forces both sellers to lower their prices.
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The decrease in donation price stops once donation quality
q becomes higher than the threshold q̂c and so the supplier
is driven out. In this case, the corrupt manager replaces the
supplier as the monopoly provider and charges the monopoly
(1−𝛼)T m
, which is the price the supplier charges in
price pb∗ =
D
the base case. This means the healthcare welfare is the same
as the base case if donation quality is the same as the fresh
quality, and will be lower if the donation quality is lower. As
such, if the donation quality is high (i.e., q > q̂c ), then the
corrupt manager makes the situation worse than the base case
in at least two aspects: by driving out the supplier and hurting the local industry, and by reducing the healthcare welfare
(compared to the base case) unless q = v.
The above discussion indicates that the healthcare welfare
achieved in the corrupt case becomes equal to that achieved in
the base case when donation quality q = 0 and q = v, yet for
different reasons and with different implications. A corrupt
manager makes donations of a very high quality (i.e., q > q̂c )
more harmful as they lead to lower healthcare welfare than
the base case, on top of driving out the local supplier. One
way to mitigate such negative impact is by only allowing
donations of a quality lower than the threshold q̂c . Similar
to the noncorrupt case, we note that the quality threshold
q̂c depends on the supplier’s minimum viable price p̃, so a
preferable situation is when p̃ is at a medium to low level (rel(1−𝛼)T m
), enabling the supplier to
ative to the monopoly price
D
remain in the market with a reasonably high donation quality.
While these results are derived with the model setup so that
the supplier and the corrupt manager compete for the product
market, another possibility is that they collude, set a nonzero
price that they both agree on, and then split the earnings in
some fashion, particularly when q > q̂c : The corrupt manager may want to collude and keep the supplier in the market
to cover his selling behavior, thereby avoiding being questioned on selling donations if the supplier is out of market.
Though collusion is possible, it is less attractive for the supplier to collude as donation quality gets lower. This is because
as the gap between the two types of products gets larger, the
supplier will have more motivation to compete with the donation product that is of a lower quality. Thus, donations of
a quality slightly lower than the fresh product, as discussed
in Section 4.1, could not only alleviate the adverse effect on
the local industry, but also restrict the harm from the corrupt
manager and mitigate the risk of collusion. This leads to our
second key observation.

driving out the supplier. However, if the donation quality q is
below the threshold q̂c as suggested above, the corrupt manv
; this
ager could prefer a low quality, particularly if q̂c >
2𝛼+1
is because the manager’s earnings decrease with donation
v
quality q once q ≥
. As a result, if the corrupt man2𝛼+1
ager could choose the quality of the donation, he would want
v
q=
, where he can charge the highest price and earn the
2𝛼+1

v

The corrupt manager will have a preference for donation
quality since it affects his earnings. Not surprisingly, the corrupt manager will want donations of a high quality, that is,
q > q̂c , as this will enable him to pocket high earnings by

2𝛼+1

by when 𝛼 approaches 1, where the healthcare administra3
tion puts little attention on the product. While we suggest an
allowable donation quality slightly lower than the threshold
q̂c , it is important to prevent the corrupt manager from purposely delaying the diversion of donations and waiting for the
quality to deteriorate to his desired level.
Since donation quality plays a key role in the studied
effects, preventative mitigation measures are necessary to
ensure the quality level is appropriate. To make the quality
lower than the threshold quality, the donation products can be
clearly labeled with the approaching or passed expiry dates
and the projected effectiveness. Yet, due to the possibility that
a corrupt manager waits for donation products to degrade,
it is not clear whether any other regulatory actions taken
by the donors, such as clearly labeling when the donation
should be distributed by, can mitigate this form of corruption.
In-country studies would need to be carried out to examine
whether this corruption effect is likely to occur in practice,
which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

5

COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSIONS

In this section, we compare the results of the three cases:
base case, noncorrupt manager, and corrupt manager, and
summarize the results in Proposition EC.3 in the Supporting
Information. We then discuss how the three cases compare
with each other in terms of the supplier’s price and the
healthcare welfare, and summarize the results for low-priority
products, for example, PPE, as considered in this paper.

5.1
Observation 2. Donations of a reasonable quality (below
fresh but still of significant value) continue to be a viable
solution when the manager is corrupt; mitigation measures are of use to ensure an appropriate quality level for
donated products.

v

highest personal gain. Note that the threshold
depends
2𝛼+1
on the parameter 𝛼, which reflects the preference for the
product in the healthcare welfare function. For the typical
products considered in this paper that tend to have a large
v
can be low; and the value is bounded
𝛼, the threshold

The market price

In this subsection, we discuss how the supplier’s price compares across the three cases, as in Proposition EC.3, Item 1, in
the Supporting Information, and in Figure 1. When donation
is available, the supplier sets the market price lower than the
base case, no matter whether the manager is corrupt or not,
that is, pn∗ ≤ pb∗ and pc∗ ≤ pb∗ . This is not surprising since
donation provides an extra source of products, thus competing with the supplier; and that is why high-quality donation
could drive out the supplier.
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FIGURE 1

11

Comparison of prices in different scenarios [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

The comparison between the noncorrupt and the corrupt
case is not intuitive as it depends on donation quality q. If
q > (1 − 2𝛼)v, the supplier’s price is higher in the corrupt
case than in the noncorrupt case. This is because the corrupt
manager selling the donated products will ease the pressure
for the supplier to lower market price, as donation products on
sale are not as competitive as free donation products provided
by the noncorrupt manager.
Yet, if donation quality q ≤ (1 − 2𝛼)v, then the corrupt
manager pushes the supplier to lower her price more than
when the manager is noncorrupt. This surprising result is due
to the condition q ≤ (1 − 2𝛼)v: For it to hold under a nonnegative donation quality q, the parameter 𝛼 needs to be lower
than 0.5 (see Figure 1a), which indicates that a region places
considerable weight on quality in its welfare function. As
such, donations of a low quality do not directly compete with
fresh products in the noncorrupt case: Low-quality donation
will primarily attract low-budget regions while high-budget
regions will still buy fresh products, so the supplier can
charge a relatively high price. Since the corrupt manager
will set a low donation price to attract low-budget regions,
this leaves regions that plan to buy a combination of fresh
and donation products with a smaller amount to spend on
fresh products, and thus forces the supplier to lower her price
compared to the noncorrupt case. This suggests the corrupt
manager hurts the local supplier more than the noncorrupt
manager if the donation quality is lower than (1 − 2𝛼)v.

5.2

Production and Operations Management

The healthcare welfare

The comparison of the healthcare welfare is illustrated in
Figure 2. We first compare the noncorrupt case with the base
case, which shows the same pattern in both Figure 2a,b. If the
donation quality q is smaller than the threshold q̂n so the supplier remains in the market, then, with a noncorrupt manager,

donation improves healthcare welfare for all regions compared to the base case: It always holds that W n (T) ≥ W b (T),
where equality occurs when q = 0. This especially helps poor
regions that desperately need the product, as they gain access
through the donated products and thus buy less fresh products compared to the base case. Regions with a high budget
also have increased welfare because they can afford more
fresh products given that the free in-kind donation pushes the
supplier’s price down.
It is interesting to observe from Proposition EC.3, Item 3,
in the Supporting Information, that donation could make a
high-budget region’s healthcare welfare lower than that in
the base case when the supplier is driven out. This happens
for regions with budget T >

qT m
v

−𝛼

𝛼 1−𝛼 when donation quality
qT m

−𝛼

q>
Note that the threshold
𝛼 1−𝛼 can be higher than
v
the budget upper bound T m when donation quality q is high,
so it is possible that all regions have their healthcare welfare improved compared to the base case, as shown in both
Figure 2a,b. Yet, the reasons for the welfare improvement
could be different from when donation quality is low. While
poor regions continue to improve welfare through accessing free donation, welfare improvement (if any, compared
to the base case) for high-budget regions comes from the
budget saved from not buying the product. This is because
high-budget regions are forced to turn to donated products
when the supplier is driven out, even though they may still
want to buy from the supplier.
The comparison between the corrupt manager case and
the base case also depends on the donation quality q. Similar
to the noncorrupt manager case, donation under a corrupt
manager improves healthcare welfare for all regions if donation quality q ≤ q̂c so the supplier can remain in the market.
Despite the manager being corrupt, donation enables regions
with a low budget to access the product through donation,
and also pushes the supplier to reduce the price, so regions
q̂n .
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two ranges, but for different reasons. (1) If the donation quality q ≤ min{q̂n , q̂c , (1 − 2𝛼)v}, the supplier can remain in the
market in both the noncorrupt and the corrupt cases, and
the condition q ≤ (1 − 2𝛼)v means high-budget regions have
higher welfare in the corrupt case (see Figure 2a). This is
because, as discussed in Section 5.1, the corrupt manager
pushes the supplier to lower her price further than the noncorrupt manager if q ≤ (1 − 2𝛼)v. So, high-budget regions that
continue to buy from the supplier enjoy a lower price in the
corrupt case and thus achieve a higher welfare. (2) The second
range q̂n < q < q̂c indicates that the supplier is pushed out of
the market when the manager is noncorrupt but stays in the
market when the manager is corrupt (see both Figure 2a,b).
This makes high-budget regions’ welfare lower in the noncorrupt case because they would have benefited from buying
from the supplier but are forced to turn to donation.
While a high-budget region’s welfare can be higher in the
corrupt case, the corrupt manager always makes a low-budget
region’s welfare lower than in the noncorrupt case. This further confirms the harm caused by corruption: Diverting and
selling donation products hurt poor regions that need help the
most; the inequality of resources in the recipient country is
deepened, as it enables rich regions to take advantage of poor
regions. This is summarized in the next key observation.
Observation 4. Compared to the noncorrupt manager, the
corrupt manager reduces the healthcare welfare in most cases,
but could cause an increase in the healthcare welfare for
some high-budget regions if donation quality q is within
certain ranges.
F I G U R E 2 Comparison of welfare in different scenarios [Color
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

with a high budget can afford more fresh products. Yet, if the
donation quality is so high that the supplier exits the market,
then the healthcare welfare becomes lower than in the base
case for all regions (in both Figure 2a,b), unless the donation
quality is the same as the fresh quality. This is because
the corrupt manager replaces the supplier to become the
monopoly provider in the market and sells donated products
whose quality is no higher than the fresh quality. This leads
to our key observation below.
Observation 3. Compared to the base case, donation
improves a region’s healthcare welfare if the supplier remains
in the market; but could reduce healthcare welfare when
donation quality is high enough that the supplier is driven out
of the market, especially if the manager is corrupt.
When comparing the corrupt and noncorrupt cases, as in
Proposition EC.3, Item 5, in the Supporting Information, it
is not surprising that corruption is harmful, with healthcare
welfare in the corrupt case being lower than that in the noncorrupt case for most regions. However, it is unexpected that
some high-budget regions can have a higher welfare in the
corrupt case. This happens when the donation quality is in

Note that if the parameter 𝛼 is small, then a high donation quality could satisfy the condition q ≤ (1 − 2𝛼)v, under
which the corrupt case leads to a lower market price and
higher welfare for high-budget regions than the noncorrupt
case. In other words, donation of a relatively high quality
could enable the corrupt manager to hurt the local supplier
and benefit rich regions at the cost of poor regions if the
product has a small parameter 𝛼 and thus a high priority in
the healthcare system. This suggests the negative impacts of
the corrupt manager are greater for high-priority products,
such as vaccines and critical equipment, for which a very
high quality is essential. For such critical and high-priority
products, donation of a quality that is below fresh but still of
significant value may not be a good solution, especially when
it is hard to tell whether the manager is corrupt. As explained
in the introduction, we mainly consider low-priority products
like PPE and similar products. Thus, in the next subsection,
we focus on low-priority products and summarize the results
that particularly apply to them.

5.3

For low-priority products

For typical low-priority products where the parameter 𝛼
is high, that is, 𝛼 > 0.5, the comparison between the
corrupt and the noncorrupt cases is more straightforward, as
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shown in Figures 1b and 2b. First, the corrupt case has a
higher donation-quality threshold below which the supplier
can remain in the market, that is, q̂c > q̂n always holds. This
is because the supplier’s minimum viable price p̃ < pb∗ and
1−𝛼 m
Tm
T < . Second, the supplier’s price is higher in
pb∗ =
D
2D
the corrupt case. This is because q > (1 − 2𝛼)v always holds
since (1 − 2𝛼)v is negative. Third, the corrupt case leads to a
lower healthcare welfare in most cases, except for some highbudget regions if donation quality q is between the quality
thresholds in the corrupt and noncorrupt cases, that is, if the
supplier is driven out in the noncorrupt case but not the corrupt case. Overall, these results suggest that for low-priority
products, despite hurting the healthcare welfare compared to
the noncorrupt case, the corrupt manager does not add to the
adverse effect on the local supplier; specifically, with a donation quality that can keep the supplier in the market with a
noncorrupt manager, the supplier can stay in the market even
if the manager is corrupt.
Meanwhile, while Proposition EC.3, Item 3, in the Supporting Information, indicates the noncorrupt case could lead
to lower welfare than the base case, this is less likely to hap−𝛼

pen for low-priority products. This is because 𝛼 1−𝛼 is larger
than 1 and increases with 𝛼: So long as donation quality q
qT m

−𝛼

and the parameter 𝛼 are not too low, the threshold
𝛼 1−𝛼 is
v
m
higher than T , which means all regions can achieve higher
welfare in the noncorrupt case than the base case. Further,
as the comparison between the corrupt case and the base
case does not depend on the parameter 𝛼, all regions achieve
a higher welfare in the corrupt case (compared to the base
case) if the supplier can remain in the market, but get a lower
welfare if the supplier exits.
As such, for low-priority products with the parameter 𝛼
larger than 0.5, a pragmatic solution could be donations of
a quality lower than the quality threshold in the noncorrupt
case (and thus lower than the fresh quality). There are at least
three benefits. The first is improved healthcare outcomes: The
recipient’s healthcare welfare is higher than when there is
no donation, no matter whether the manager is corrupt or
not. The second is alleviating the adverse effects on the local
industry: The supplier can remain in the market no matter
whether the manager is corrupt or not, and the corrupt manager does not make the adverse effect on the local supplier
worse. The third benefit is constraining the negative consequences from corruption: Though the corrupt case leads to
lower healthcare welfare than the noncorrupt case, all regions
suffer, thus eliminating the chance that high-budget regions
take advantage of low-budget regions when the manager
is corrupt.

6
CONCLUSIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION
This paper models the impact of donating dated PPE-type
medical supplies from a developed country’s medical reserve.
We find that donation quality plays a key role in the
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healthcare welfare, the effect on the local supplier, and the
impact of corruption. In particular, we find that the value of
donation is not monotone in quality. The healthcare outcome
does not always increase with the donation quality: Recipient
regions could experience a sharp decrease in healthcare welfare if donation quality goes above certain threshold where
the supplier is driven out of the market; and this happens no
matter whether the manager is corrupt or not.
As such, our results suggest it helps to provide donations of
a quality that is slightly lower than the quality threshold determined when the manager is noncorrupt (and thus lower than
the fresh quality). Dated stocks that are proved to be stable
with rigorous testing can and should be donated when they
are close to or just past the labeled shelf life, while donations
of dated stocks that are unstable or whose quality deteriorates
quickly with time should be avoided. Low-quality donation
does not help with the healthcare welfare when the manager
is noncorrupt, and can produce more harm than good when
coupled with a corrupt manager by hurting both poor regions
and the local supplier. However, donating products that are
of a quality higher than the quality threshold or even higher
than the quality of the local supplies, while possibly good
for short-term health outcomes when the manager is noncorrupt, is likely to be detrimental in the long run by driving the
local supplier out of business. This argues for making donation available that are clearly stamped as dated, in order to
indicate their quality is lower than the fresh.
Given these results we recommend that the WHO reconsiders its stance on such donations. In situations with no
additional concerns about safety and ethics, they could ease
their strict policy of totally abandoning dated donations, especially for products confirmed to be stable long after the initial
shelf life. It would, of course, be prudent to run a pilot
program with a single product first to see if there are any
unanticipated adverse effects. Given that 84% of the DHS’
reserve stock of hand sanitizer has previously been reported
to have passed its expiry date (US DHS, 2014) and impoverished countries are experiencing shortages of the product and
using diluted hand-wash (Ider et al., 2012), this might be an
obvious product to start with. Masks, needles, and syringes
are other obvious candidates for donation.
As these donations come from the reserve, it would also
help avoid expiration and dumping of the reserve stock.
Two other ways to reduce expiration in the reserve are
stock rotation (e.g., Zhou & Olsen, 2017) and shelf life
extension (Courtney et al., 2009). However, such solutions
are not always effective. Routinely rotating old reserve supply to regular daily operational use in the healthcare system
(and then replacing with new stocks) may be uneconomic due
to high handling costs and the possible remote location of the
reserve. The SLEP in the United States, which extends the
shelf life of the reserve products so they can be stored for a
longer period, is a reactive way to delay expiration: Products
still need to be replaced when they reach the extended shelf
life. Instead, donating these stocks would use them effectively
for the vast population in need of medical resources. When it
comes to implementation, it is important to prevent dumping
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and making inappropriate donations, and the donor needs to
discuss and seek consent from the recipient nation prior to
making any dated donations.
While we have discussed the negative effects of donation
on local suppliers, we have not specifically explored how to
alleviate this side effect. As our results highlight the influence
of donation quality, it is left for future research to explore
other mechanisms to constrain the side effects and support
local suppliers. Also, we have not discussed what lobbying medical supply companies might engage in if such a
program was suggested. One possibility to avoid such lobbying would be to ask a large medical supplies company
to actually run the program. They would undoubtedly be
quite diligent in replacing dated supplies in the host country’s reserve (since that is direct income), and therefore might
be willing to donate the funds available to distribute the dated
supplies. As mentioned earlier, they would be in the best position to ensure that the donations go to regions that are doing
without the product (and therefore reduce issues of local supply replacement). Further, in the long run, this may improve
demand from the impoverished country as using this product
becomes the expected norm. Finally, eliminating local middlemen from the process would also reduce the opportunities
for corruption.
While our models are relatively simple, we believe they
capture the key trade-offs faced in these scenarios. One limitation is that our model assumes full information. While this
assumption is relative standard and allows us to derive meaningful results, future work considering partial information
could enrich the story. We frame quality as age dependent,
and it is left for future research to capture more dimensions
of the quality variable. Our model considers a particular type
of medical supplies, such as PPE and similar products, which
are purchased and used by regions to fulfill their healthcare needs, and thus is not applicable to general donation
items bought by end-user consumers. As our model focuses
on a typical region, considering other forms of corruption
before donation reaches the region could make an interesting separate study in the future, as would the consideration
of donation of products for emergency (rather than routine)
healthcare needs.
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